Commented reading: Journal
of the Philosophy of History, 2014, 8, 3 – Part 1
Berber Bevernage, Broos Delanote, Anton
Froeyman, Kenan Van de Mieroop. Introduction: The Future of the Theory and
Philosophy of History, pp. 141-148.
International Network for Theory of History’s inaugural conference took place in Ghent, Belgium, last year, “around the central theme of the future of the theory and philosophy of history.” (141) The current edition of the Journal of the Philosophy of History gathers some of the papers presented there.
In this introduction, the authors ask
themselves: “[…] what do these articles tell us about the future of philosophy
of history?” (146) “[T]he first thing we see”, they say, “is that creating the
future requires one to deal with the heritage of the field: the programs,
projects and problems of the previous generation.” They evaluate, in short, that
new philosophers of history assume “a moderate stance in relation to the
tradition”. (146)
The authors point out that the history of the
discipline is “is so often emplotted in a conventional narrative form:
depending on one’s feelings about positivism and the ‘scientific’
interpretation of the writing of history, this story will almost inevitably
take the form of either a comedy or a tragedy.” (146-147) Further, they specify:
“If we understand the story of our field as a series of paradigm shifts which
were affected by singular heroic acts of intellectual innovation, then it is
easy to see how it can be hard to position oneself as a young researcher.” (147)
Although the claim seems to me unquestionably accurate, it seems to leave out
the what is most essential: the fact that the narrativists thesis not only substantially
broadened our understanding of historical epistemology, but are also
articulable with, and even openly stimulate, a whole array of new questions.
The editors identify a shift in the field, “from
epistemological and methodological questions towards ethical, political and
existential questions.” Now, as Herman Paul has shown (in Hayden White: The Historical
Imagination), although
White's work has generated countless epistemological discussions, it was itself
much more worried about issues of “ethical, political, and existential”
character. Then, I’d suggest the younger authors’ relation with the tradition of
the field is also the result of the merits of their (in W. B. Gallie’s term) “original exemplars”. Danto
proposed that “a first test of a philosophical theory should be that it account
for itself whenever relevant” (The Decline and Fall of the
Analytical Philosophy of History, p. 73): according to him, Kuhn’s paradigm
theory could do so, but Hempel’s deductive-nomological model could not. Here in this introduction, is worth
noticing that the authors deliberately explained the “heroic” position often
attributed to White resorting to White’s own theories. I would take this as an example
of the power of the tools his oeuvre puts at our disposal – although not in an
intrinsically heroic way. Continuing the comparison: for Danto, the
pre-narrativist debate about the applicability of the covering law-model to
history was not solved, but simply abandoned: Hempel’s proposals, for him, were
still valid; they merely lost their relevance. Now, as to narrativist debate, seems
possible to me to state that the situation is somewhat different: the epistemological discussions lost their
relevance, but, on the other hand, other aspects of the tradition kept it – maybe
because of its malleability, since narratives and representations permeate both
history as process and history as writing and are (arguably, at least) directly
related to topics such as memory, experience, trauma, and others.
(Even the most “radical” of the proposals set
at the conference, the attempt to effectuate a “a rehabilitation of speculative
philosophy of history”, was openly advocated by White in Metahistory,
whose first “general conclusion” claims that “there can be no ‘proper history’
which is not at the same time ‘philosophy of history’ [p. xi]. More recently,
David Carr proposed a “metaphilosophy of history”, developed in dialogue with Danto’s
and White’s paradigmatic thesis [not to mention his own, more clearly stated in
Time,
Narrative, and History], in which the “classical philosophy of history”
is understood not as a cognitive or theoretical embodiment of the teleological
structure, but as a practical
embodiment of it.” [Re-Figuring Hayden White, p. 25])
The authors also acknowledge what has just been
said: in the end, they look for support in the notion of “practical
past” – borrowed by White from Michael Oakeshott –, as an antidote
to the fact, pointed out by Gabrielle Spiegel, that “the concepts of memory and
memory studies in general are in danger of losing their critical perspective”: “What
we advocate,” they say, “is a more reflective approach that is closer to what
Hayden White has called the ‘practical past’. We welcome White’s call to
embrace the practical past provided that the term ‘practical’ is interpreted in
a double way: on the one hand as a denotation of a study object (the way the
past is used to change or conserve the present), but on the other hand also,
and maybe even more importantly, as an urge to make our research practically
relevant.” (147-148) Bevernage's History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice is an excellent example of this approach.
The authors also acknowledge what has just been
said: in the end, they look for support in the notion of “practical
past” – borrowed by White from Michael Oakeshott –, as an antidote
to the fact, pointed out by Gabrielle Spiegel, that “the concepts of memory and
memory studies in general are in danger of losing their critical perspective”: “What
we advocate,” they say, “is a more reflective approach that is closer to what
Hayden White has called the ‘practical past’. We welcome White’s call to
embrace the practical past provided that the term ‘practical’ is interpreted in
a double way: on the one hand as a denotation of a study object (the way the
past is used to change or conserve the present), but on the other hand also,
and maybe even more importantly, as an urge to make our research practically
relevant.” (147-148) Bevernage's History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice is an excellent example of this approach.
